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Introduction
An unacknowledged tension exists today between two central, unquestioned axioms of
Article III jurisprudence. One is the familiar black-letter law rule that a “plaintiff generally must
assert his own rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.”1 This principle takes root in Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in
Marbury v. Madison, which directed federal courts “solely to decide on the rights of
individuals.”2 The second axiom is implicit in numerous Supreme Court precedents dating back
decades yet rarely articulated explicitly. It holds that individual litigants can secure relief not
merely for violations of their own individual rights, but also for infringements of the
Constitution’s institutional architecture—i.e., states’ rights or branches’ prerogatives. Judges
routinely invoke principles of separation of powers3 or federalism4 that seem to adhere in
institutions to award relief to individual litigants. However hallowed they might be, these two
axioms coexist only uneasily. For structural constitutional principles are rarely conceived in
individualized terms. Rather they align more closely with “generalized grievance[s] shared by a
large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure”5 that Article III is crafted to keep at
bay.
In a little-noticed opinion handed down in penultimate week of the October Term 2010,
the Supreme Court took up this tension, and resolved it unanimously in favor of justiciability.6
Writing for the Court in Bond v. United States, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that “[a]n
individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between
the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is
concrete, particularized, and redressible.”7 Individuals are also protected by the separation of
powers, observed Kennedy, and hence “not disabled from relying on [that] principl[e] in

*

Assistant professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. This is a discussion draft, and not for citation or
quotation.
1
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
2
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (punctuation omitted).
3
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating line-item veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732−34 (1986)
(invalidating direct congressional control of spending); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983) (invalidating
legislative veto).
4
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168
(1992).
5
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
6
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
7
131 S. Ct. at 2364 (emphasis added).

1

otherwise justiciable cases and controversies.”8 Bond in effect means that an individual
otherwise properly situated for Article III purposes can involve not just her own constitutional
interests but also those of our shared constitutional institutions as grounds for relief.
Bond occasioned thunderous silence in the law reviews.9 Perhaps this inattention is
understandable. Bond upset no statutory or doctrinal status quo. While hardly a mundane sight,
individual plaintiffs do invoke structural constitutional flaws for relief periodically in federal
court—and indeed have done so for nearly a century.10 Nor did Bond occasion any downstream
policy upset. Given the historical pedigree of individual standing in structural constitutional
litigation, its Article III holding presages no large reordering of federal-court litigation. To the
contrary, the brevity and unanimity of Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggested the Court was
merely resolving a trivial housekeeping matter in the “incoherent and confusing” field of
standing.11
But the question whether individual litigants should have standing to raise structural
constitutional questions is more complex than Bond and commentators suppose. At its core, this
Article advances the claim that individuals are typically ill-positioned to vindicate structural
constitutional values. In lieu of the current Article III disposition, I instead propose the following
rule: when an individual litigant seeks to enforce a structural constitutional principle that
immediately redounds to the benefit of an official institution, and there is no reason the latter
could not enforce that interest itself, a federal court should not permit the individual litigant to
allege and obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or federalism. In the mine run of
cases, Congress, the executive branch, or a state will be available to vindicate a structural
principle. The relevant institution should be left to elect whether or not to do so. In such
instances, individual litigants should be categorically barred from obtaining relief based on the
traducing of governance structures held in common. Consistent with my proposed rule, however,
I further identify a subset of cases in which individuals ought to have standing. In these cases,
litigants assert a due process-like interest isomorphic with Article III of the Constitution.12 The
individual interest and the structural principle wholly overlap in such litigation. Additionally, no
official actor is available to enforce the structural principle. In such instances, standing should be
permitted for individual litigants.
My analysis of individual standing for the structural constitution rests on two pillars, one
doctrinal and the other sounding in political-economy terms. I first consider the Court’s tangled
constitutional and prudential standing framework,13 a jurisprudential morass famous for its
“unpredictability and ideological nature.”14 Given that complexity, it should be no surprise that
precedent can be leveraged into a plausible case either for or against individual standing for the
structural constitution. Resisting the jurisprudence’s entropic tendency, I contend that the Bond
8
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Court’s analysis failed to account for several of Article III’s foundational values. Even on narrow
doctrinal grounds, it is unjustified. Large lacunae mar Bond’s constitutional analysis while
prudential concerns insistently list against individual standing.
The second element of my analysis moves beyond standing’s doctrinal moorings to
situate individual standing for the structural constitution in a political economy and institutional
context. Drawing on public-choice and political science tools, I query whether such standing will
indeed vindicate the separation of powers and federalism. Application of such tools yields even
yet more reason to be skeptical of individual standing for the structural constitution. My analysis
compares the effects of individual and institutional standing. Individuals’ incentives, I argue,
conduce away from the goals of structural constitutionalism, and are indeed likely to exacerbate
rent-seeking pathologies in the legislative process. Counterintuitively, opening the door to more
individual litigants does not necessarily generate more compliance with the structural
constitution. But in contrast to private litigants, political institutions have meaningful cause to
resist the urge to challenge desirable institutional innovations, and to invoke judicial supervision
only when truly warranted. Although very clearly far from perfect, institutional incentives are
likely to generate better outcomes than individual incentives to sue. In net, this (concededly
rough) comparative analysis suggests that structural constitutional values are best entrusted to the
institutions they directly benefit, not chanced on the happenstance of which individual litigants
find self-serving gain in their invocation.
Working hand in glove, these ‘internalist’ doctrinal and ‘externalist’ political economy
challenges suggest that individual litigation of structural constitutional rules is more likely to
distort than to sustain a constitutionally appropriate equilibrium. If structural constitutional
questions are to be adjudicated in federal court at all, it would be wise to delimit such jurisdiction
to cases filed by those institutions best placed to raise all relevant considerations—the states or
political branches that are ultimately the immediate objects of constitutional solicitude.
The analysis proceeds in five steps. Part I begins by defining the domain of relevant
inquiry, delineating the class of cases in which an individual litigant seeks to vindicate the
structural constitution. Part II canvasses the relevant standing doctrine. Part III then turns to the
Bond case to explore its conclusion that individual litigants have Article III standing to vindicate
the structural constitution. I argue that the relatively parsimonious analysis of Bond majority
opinion, while not wholly without doctrinal warrant, suppresses much difficulty that ought to be
aired. More aggressively, I press the position that a contrary holding in Bond would cohere better
with the assumptions and doctrinal specifications of Article III jurisprudence. Part IV turns from
doctrine to political economy. Drawing on institutional and public choice analytic tools, I
identify a range of undesirable effects from permitting individual standing for the structural
constitution. Based on these doctrinal and political economy analyses, Part V proposes an
alternative rule that would preclude most (but not all) individual standing for the structural
constitution.
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I.

Individual Litigants and the Structural Constitution

Structural constitutional questions present to federal courts in several ways. To clarify the
scope of my argument, I begin by identifying the subset of cases with which I am concerned
here. I then explain why these cases in fact implicate the defense of structural interests alone, and
cannot be fairly characterized as involving the defense of some sort of individual right—
specifically, what has been called a right to a valid rule.
A.

Structural Constitutional Litigation in Federal Court

To begin with, what is the class of litigation in which individuals, rather than official,
institutional actors, bring structural constitutional claims? It is certainly not the entire domain of
structural constitutional litigation. Institutional actors often press their own constitutional
interests in federal court. The president, for example, routinely asserts an Article II interest in
exercising control over administrative agencies. Congress, acting through its committees, can
also file suit seeking to vindicate constitutionally grounded interests in the midst of inter-branch
conflicts. States too vindicate federalism interests by resisting national commandeering, asserting
sovereign immunity, and challenging conditions freighted with federal spending. Indeed, the
only constitutionally salient institution that lacks the capacity to lodge objections in court on
structural constitutional grounds is the Article III judiciary itself. With that one exception, the
doors to the federal courthouse stand, as a practical matter, open to any of the institutional
entities picked out in the Constitution as salient features of our structural constitution.
But the courthouse doors also stand open to individual litigants seeking to vindicate
structural constitutional values. In the separation of powers context, for example, an individual
litigant can lodge a facial challenge to federal legislation on the ground that it violates some
aspect of the structural constitutional. Consider the 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 15 In Free Enterprise Fund, a Nevada accounting
firm challenged the regulatory authority of the federal Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (“PCAOB”).16 The accounting firm did not assert PCAOB had infringed on any
constitutionally protected interest that the firm possessed, but rather that the Board’s organic act
“contravened the separation of powers by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board
members without subjecting them to Presidential control.”17 Even though the President evinced
no wish for greater control of the board,18 the Court invalidated one part of PCAOB’s organic
statute so as to establish more direct presidential control.19 Free Enterprise Fund is not an
outlier. In earlier separation of powers cases, individual litigants have been allowed to raise the
interests of either Congress or the executive as a shield against regulation or coercive action.20
15
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The same pattern is observed in federalism cases….
IV.

The Political Economy of Standing for the Structural Constitution

This Part turns from an internal to an external perspective—that is, from doctrine to
political economy. It examines the practical consequences of extending individual standing for
the structural constitution to individuals. The analysis has two strands that together compound to
a simple comparative claim—all things considered, the structural constitution is safer in solely
institutional than in institutional and individual hands.
First, I examine the individual incentives that animate structural constitutional litigation
using public choice theory. The latter trains on the interest groups that not only drive legislative
agendas but also deploy judicial review to obtain policy goods they cannot secure in the political
process.21 Notionally a matter of high principle, structural constitutional litigation is not inured
from interest-group politics. Rather than promoting a desirable structural equilibrium, individual
standing for the structural constitution will likely promote the exogenous agendas of private
parties while undermining collective constitutional goods. Second, I consider institutional
incentives to defend the structural constitution. To this end, I employ what has been termed a
“new-separation-of-powers approach,” which posits that “we cannot fully understand the
behavior of one institution without understanding it in the context of the othe[r institutions with
which it coexists.]”22 No less than legislatures and agencies—the typical focus of the new
separation-of-powers approach—federal courts are embedded in sequential interactions with
other government institutions animated by distinctive strategic goals.23 This perspective
generates a relatively optimistic view of institutionally initiated litigation. In tandem, these two
analyses provide reasons to prefer exclusively institutional standing for the structural constitution
to the exclusion of individual litigants.
It is important to stress that my argument here is comparative in nature. I do not make the
(implausible) claim that institutions have perfectly tailored incentives. Instead, I argue that a
comparison of individual and institutional incentives suggests that we secure more desirable
results by limiting standing to institutions.
A.

Individual Standing for the Structural Constitution Reconsidered

This Subpart develops two consequentialist arguments against the proposition that
individuals should have standing to litigate the structural constitution. Together, these arguments
of federal spending to challenge President Clinton’s use of a line-item veto as an infringement on Congress’s lawmaking authority. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
21
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undermine the intuitive notion that opening the courthouse door wider to private litigants
conduces to greater fidelity to the Constitution. The first argument explains why that intuition,
likely grounded for many in the individual rights context, cannot be translated into the structural
constitutional context. The second line of attack draws on public choice theory and focuses more
tightly on private litigants’ likely incentives in practice.
1.

The Divergent Goals of Rights and Structural Litigation

Recall that Part III.A posited a distinction between individual rights and structural
constitutional adjudication—the difference between maximizing and equilibriating. Whereas a
court’s responsibility respecting individual rights is to maximize the latter within the bounds of
legitimate state interests, a court’s task in respect to the separation of powers and federalism
involves a more complex balancing act. A judge facing a structural constitutional question
cannot merely maximize one value within constraints, but must instead thread carefully between
several distinct and inconsistent constitutional values to attain a desirable equilibrium. Given the
distinction between these two goals, it is likely that generous individual standing rules will fit
comfortably with the courts’ goals in individual rights cases but have perverse, undesired effects
in structural constitutional litigation.
The distinction I draw here between rights and structural litigation relies on the
assumption that more permissive standing rules are likely to increase the volume of potential
litigation and therefore to increase the likelihood of a given constitutional good being vindicated.
This assumption of a positive correlation between standing rules and litigation outputs rests on
simple, if not wholly uncontroversial, premises. To air these premises, consider a counterfactual
world in which a constitutional value—say, the Establishment Clause—can only be enforced by
litigants who cannot choose to opt out of the challenged government institution.24 In this
counterfactual world, school children could challenge graduation prayers, but citizens could not
challenge religious displays in public buildings. Courts would not be able to confront all
government practices that might trench on Establishment Clause values. Moreover, judges
receive only a weak signal that there is any reason for concern about impermissible
establishment outside Article III parameters. On the other hand, imagine a world of generous
standing to challenge alleged establishments in schools, government buildings, official practices,
and even coinage. The larger volume of persons with relevant injuries makes it more likely that
courts will be presented with fact-patterns raising all potential ways in which a constitutional
good can be violated. Litigants will have many more opportunities to raise challenges, to
distinguish earlier precedent, and to locate sympathetic plaintiffs. To the extent they plough their
furrows in a common-law, incrementalist vein, judges also have more opportunities to explicate
and thus reinforce the constitutional value. More permissive standing rules additionally have
epistemic pay-offs for judges. And with more potential plaintiffs, it is more likely that courts will
quickly promulgate decision rules dealing with all possible ways in which a right can be
compromised.25 In all these ways, a greater volume of potential litigants increases the courts’
24
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ability to vindicate constitutional rights to their fullest extent possible within the bounds of
legitimate state interests.26 To be sure, it is certainly possible that courts will reject Establishment
Clause claims across the board. But it is still much more likely that the relevant constitutional
good will be enforced in expectation.27
In the individual rights domain, courts’ goal of maximizing the attainment of rights
means that more expansive judicial vindication of a constitutional good is, all things considered,
likely to be desirable. Broader standing means that the shadow of judicial intervention is more
likely to have a general deterrence in addition to a specific deterrence effect. As one
commentator explains, “[t]he availability of private suits [will] increase the likelihood that
enforcement actions will occur, and, as a result, would cause more potential defendants to refrain
from conduct they would otherwise engage.”28
By contrast, the goal of structural constitutional litigation is the more delicate task of
attaining and maintaining an appropriate interbranch or intergovernmental equilibrium.
Increasing the volume of litigants will not necessarily conduce to this balancing goal. The net
effect of a larger volume of litigation on either the federal or interbranch balance depends on the
precise content of that engorged litigant flow. For permissive individual standing rules to yield
desirable results, the expected stream of individual litigants alleging structural constitutional
error would have to be composed in such a way as to anticipate and produce the right interbranch
or intergovernmental balance. For example, it would be necessary to have just the right number
of litigants pressing states’ rights and just the right number of countervailing litigants trumpeting
the national government’s interests. In the separation of powers domain, each branch would also
need its own (numerically correctly proportioned) cadre of champions in court.29 In short, it
would be necessary to have a population of litigants precisely composed of the right sort of
claimants to avoid lopsided imbalances in favor of either a particular branch or particular level of
government. But there is simply no reason to believe we possess such good fortune. Nor can we
plausibly posit some providential invisible hand to assure the correct distribution of litigants.
Optimistic predictions are rendered even more improbable by two aspects of current
standing doctrine. First, the doctrinal rule against generalized grievances ensures that judicial
coverage of structural constitutional issues will be patchy. Even under an expansive view of
individual standing for the structural constitution, not all structural principles have proved to be
justiciable. Two examples from the separation of powers context illustrate. First, the Framers
included provisions in Article I to prevent the executive from “seducing congressmen with
26
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government sinecures” or bribing them with “double salaries or make-work jobs.”30 The Court,
however, has treated these ‘anti-entanglement’ rules as nonjusticiable. Hence, violations of the
Emoluments Clause31 generate no actionable injury, 32 and violations of the Ineligibility Clause33
similarly create no individual Article III plaintiffs.34 In each line of cases, the bar to generalized
grievances shuts down enforcement of elements in the structural constitution designed to prevent
excessive interbranch overlap.35 As a result, the institutional design principle of restricting
impermissible interbranch entanglements will be systematically underenforced because of a
consistent undersupply of eligible plaintiffs.36 At the same time, other elements of the
Constitution that have a checking effect through mandatory interbranch entanglements—e.g.,
impeachment, the veto, and the senatorial confirmation role in appointments—all operate with
judicial enforcement. The net result is quantitative unevenness in judicial vindication of the
structural constitution as interbranch checks are enforced, but limits on interbranch
entanglements are not.
A second example of the unbalancing consequences of access rules concerns the
allocation of law-making power. With the exception of two seemingly “aberration[al]” outliers in
the 1930s, the Court has declined to enforce any strong constraint on the quantum of delegation
from Congress to the executive branch.37 At the same time, the Court has also continued to allow
plaintiffs to challenge legislative efforts to regulate delegations post hoc. 38 Another asymmetry
ensues. The Court evinces large deference to political branches’ institutional choices along one
margin, hence enabling large institutional change. But then, along another diametrically opposed
margin, it “prevents … compensating adjustment from being made by any institution, short of
obtaining a constitutional amendment.”39 The result is that interest groups have ample
opportunities to mobilize in the courts—but only with respect to violations of Article I by
Congress, not converse executive abrogations of legislative power. Again, the expected result of
such uneven access to the federal courts is not a desirable structural equilibrium, but imbalanced
and erratic outputs.
Asymmetries of the sort identified here are hardly unique to the separation of powers. In
the federalism domain, the Court has treated some federal governmental obligations toward the
state as nullities on justiciability grounds. Individuals seeking to invoke states’ interests created
30
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by the Elections Clause of Article have been turned away at the courthouse door.40 Similarly,
efforts to invoke the federal obligation to maintain states’ “Republican Form of Government”
have been blocked on political-question grounds.41 Even as the Court has assiduously tended to
one side of the federalism dynamic, it thus systematically fails to enforce positive duties owed by
the national government to the states. In the end, these asymmetries mean the courts will
systematically slight some aspects of the interbranch or intergovernmental balance, even as other
aspects secure plenary vindication.
The second reason for expecting distorted outcomes from individual standing focuses on
the doctrinal details of standing: the injury-of-fact, causation, and redressibility elements of the
doctrine as now drawn virtually guarantee the uneven distribution of individual litigation over
structural constitution values.
Consider, by way of a motivating example, the legislative veto, which was invalidated in
1983 in INS v. Chadha.42 Congress had been using simple resolutions to direct cabinet secretaries
to engage in investigations and issue reports since at least 1903.43 A first legislative veto was
enacted in 1932—more than fifty years before the Chadha opinion.44 It is surely worth inquiring
as to why there was an absence of constitutional challenges to the legislative veto for about half a
century.45 One possible explanation is that Congress did not need to use the legislative veto
frequently in order to influence executive-branch behavior—the mere shadow of congressional
responses was sufficient to induce desired agency policies.46 If legislative vetoes were largely
anticipated by agencies unwilling to antagonize their congressional paymasters, we would expect
to see less agency slack and few instances in which Congress in fact deployed the veto.
Anticipated responsiveness on the executive’s part, however, would drain the pool of individuals
who could satisfy the injury in fact, causation, and redressibility requirements of Article III
standing.47 At the same time, Congress would still obtain roughly the results it would have
obtained via active use of the veto.
Alternatively, a structural constitutional violation may generate no litigants with Article
III standing because it throws up only immediate winners. Hence, the White House might accept
an unconstitutional restriction upon its appointment or directive authority because it is in the
40
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short-term political interest of an Oval Office incumbent. Or states might accept an
impermissible intrusion on their regulatory jurisdiction to gain cost-savings. The Constitution
may be violated in both cases, but all those directly affected are beneficiaries of the violation.
And beneficiaries cannot sue. This problem is somewhat parallel to the concern with “givings”
identified by property scholars as the hidden corollary of the takings problem. Roughly speaking,
a ‘givings’ arises when “the value of … property increases as a result of governance action” even
if the government does not act directly on the property.48 Like takings, givings implicate fairness,
efficiency, and anti-rent-seeking concerns.49 Yet givings are largely off the judicial radar. The
result is a skewed jurisprudence that often gives a free pass to rent-seeking and other foibles
supposedly parried by the Taking Clause.50 The same concerns, mutatis mutandi, arise in the
structural constitutional context, when constitutional violations produce an immediate social
welfare surplus that can be used to buy off all relevant parties.
Even when a constitutional violation has more tangible consequences, affected interest
groups may still not have a sufficient injury in fact. For example, in some instances a violation of
the separation of powers results in a loss of information for the public. Absent a statutory basis
for suit, however, no individual plaintiff has standing. Thus, in United States v. Richardson,51 the
Court held that a member of the public could not challenge violations of the Accounts Clause of
Article I, Section 9,52 based on the federal government’s failure to publish a budget for the
Central Intelligence Agency. In this fashion, the constitutional floor for injury-in-fact shapes the
universe of structural constitutional litigation filed. Along with the anticipated response problem
and the bar to beneficiary standing, the boundaries on injury-in-fact thus provide another reason
to anticipate lopsided results when individuals vindicate the structural constitution.
2.

Public Choice and Structural Constitutional Litigation

The second consequentialist argument against individual standing for the structural
constitution focuses more narrowly on the likely incentives of litigants. Incentives matter
because litigation is costly. Not all potential litigants will therefore file suit. To understand the
consequences of granting individuals standing to litigate the structural constitution, it is
necessary to model the reasons individuals have for having recourse to the courts. Public choice
theory furnishes a basis for such predictions. Developed first in the 1980s, public choice involves
application of economic models to political institutions. Scholars identified the relative cost of
collective action for interest groups of varying size as a basis for predictions about the kind of
legislative consequences (if any) the clash of interest groups would generate.53 Drawing on
Mancur Olsen’s pioneering work, which emphasized the high transaction costs encumbering
large organizations,54 they predicted that smaller, more concentrated groups would be the more
effective lobbyists.55 To be sure, public choice’s elegant predictions have been complicated and
48
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qualified by evidence that different policies generate different patterns of enactment costs,56 and
that interest-group coalitions tend to be complex and not easily reducible to a ‘small group’ or
‘large group.’57 But the theory’s core insight—that public policy is the product of competition
between private interest groups for legislative influence—remains both valid and illuminating.
Public choice insights spill over into the judicial domain. Courts, no less than legislatures,
are arenas for interest group mobilization, and public choice tools can be used to predict which
when private actors will invest in efforts to secure policy change through the courts.58 Of course,
interest groups do not influence federal judges in the same way that they obtain leverage over
legislators. Federal judges do not stand for reelection.59 They also operate under tight
“institutional constraints” that limit their ability to reward interest group entreaties.60 Interest
groups may nonetheless seek to influence appointments on the theory that judicial ideology
predicts voting behavior after appointment.61 And even after a judge is confirmed, interest
groups can influence the sequence and type of cases lodged before tribunals as a way of molding
the path of the law. After all, without a litigant well resourced and motivated enough to challenge
a law, no court will discover a given constitutional flaw.
Standing doctrine plays a gatekeeping function in the political economy of interest-group
competition over the direction of judicial interpretations of the Constitution. All else being equal,
a more permissive version of standing, vesting individuals, as well as institutions, with
courthouse access, will generate a greater volume of strategic litigation. Narrowing the
courthouse door by limiting the class of constitutionally permissible plaintiffs chokes off
interest-group incentives to invoke judicial review and so slows the rate of judicial policy
change.
Once the courthouse door is open, however, the play of incentives and interests will
determine the net effect of litigation. Given permissible standing rules, public choice theory
predicts that it will most likely be interest groups with relatively large incentives and small
collective-action costs who will invoke federal-court jurisdiction in the name of the structural
constitution. All other things being equal, this suggests that it will be “regulated industries [that
are sufficiently] well-financed and well-organized, especially when compared to the general
public and public interest groups”62 that file suit. Such “[s]mall intensely interested groups are …
likely to spend more on their litigation efforts than any large diffuse groups opposing them …
56
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[and] will on balance be able to hire more skilled lawyers and thus have more influence on the
information presented to the court about the social desirability of the parties' conduct and any
legal rule under consideration.”63 By comparison, widely diffused and weakly organized sections
of the public sharing an interest in vindicating a certain vision of the Constitution will often not
be able to muster the resources to support costly, time-consuming, and uncertain federal-court
litigation. Even ideological litigants, that is, need to find a sponsor with adequate funds to
support. With the important exception of criminal cases such as Bond and Lopez, ideologically
inspired individual litigants will often lack the incentives and resources to pursue a lonely,
seemingly quixotic crusade through the federal judicial hierarchy.
Under these conditions, the incentives of private litigants in structural constitutional cases
(including criminal cases) are likely to engender a deregulatory tilt in litigation outcomes.64
Regulated industries and entities, all else being equal, tend to seek a lighter rather than a heavily
governmental hand (except, to be sure, in instances where regulation preserves a monopoly
against new entrants). They will therefore tend to use structural constitutional litigation to
challenge regulation. This deregulatory slant can be observed in some recent developments in the
scope of the Commerce Clause65 and the emergent body of removal-power jurisprudence.66 In
both domains, major challenges to federal laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the federal
healthcare law have pursued a deregulatory agenda that interest groups had previously pressed,
unsuccessfully, in Congress. Hence, it is precisely in those rare instances in which a legislative
coalition is assembled to overcome a well organized and well resourced interest group that
structural constitutional litigation is likely to be harnessed as yet another veto-gate to delay or
derail new regulation. To the extent that the legislative process already favors certain the well
resourced and organized—as public choice theory predicts—judicial review will “only
exacerbate the influence of interest groups.”67
The deregulatory slant to interest-group incentives means that the net effect of individual
standing is not likely to align with the equilibrating goal of structural constitutionalism. If
interest groups that litigate the structural constitution are motivated by a deregulatory agenda,
there is no reason to expect that they will cease enforcement of a structural constitutional value
when it has reached its optimal level. To the contrary, they will keep pressing their claims until
they can squeeze no more private value out of litigation.68 Moreover, interest groups might use
an incremental approach to policy change as a way to carve out potential opponents into
manageable subcoalitions that can more easily be picked off while also gradually assembling a
63
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larger and larger coalition that is increasingly unstoppable.69 This piecemeal approach not only
enables a divide-and-conquer strategy by litigating interest groups, it also conforms to an
observed judicial preference for minimalism on the Supreme Court.70 Due to these entwined
dynamics, individual standing can induce larger shifts in structural constitutionalism than what
may be compelled by the Constitution or socially desirable because “advocates can nudge the
law to that end step-by-step.”71 In this fashion, the incentives of interest groups will lead to
highly imperfect enforcement of structural constitutional values.
*

*

*

Conventional wisdom posits that opening the courthouse door wider necessarily conduces
to more, and hence better, judicial enforcement of the Constitution. This truism does not hold,
however, in respect to structural constitutionalism. Instead, asymmetries and gaps in the
distribution of individual plaintiffs with structural constitutional pleas will generate inconstant
distributions of judicial enforcement. Analysis of the interest-group determinants of structural
constitutional litigation compounds the case for skepticism by identifying a further source of net
imbalance. Rather than promoting constitutional equilibriums, individual standing for the
structural constitutionalism leaves the basic law in perilous hands.
B.

Institutional Standing for the Structural Constitution

This subpart employs the “new separation of powers”72 mode of analysis to interrogate
whether institutions such as states and branches fare any better as defenders of the structural
constitution. The new separation of powers approach usefully draws attention to how courts are
embedded in a larger context of repeated interactions with other branches or the several states, all
of whom anticipate and respond strategically to each other. Application of this strategic, dynamic
lens to standing doctrine’s operation surfaces some reasons for thinking that institutional litigants
pressing structural constitutional claims will do a better job than their individual counterparts.
Again, it is worth stressing the limited reach of this claim: It is not that institutions have perfect
incentives, only that they do sufficiently better than individuals that the structural constitution is
best left in their hands alone.
Begin by considering the design task facing elected actors with respect to any policy
problem with structural constitutional implications. The separation, checking, and equilibrating
functions of structural constitutionalism must be achieved within the context of a fluid and
evolving set of government institutions separated by two centuries from the Framers’
presumptions. Elected officials need to make difficult, contextualized decisions about how best
to create stable institutional arrangements and to honor structural constitutional principles.73
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Their deals often reflect the interests of branches and subnational actors, who play roles in the
legislative process.74 Standing doctrine can either open or close the door to post hoc challenges
to structural arrangement by interest groups that lost out in the legislative process.75 More
permissive standing rules render such arrangements more vulnerable to ex post challenges, and
hence less valuable in expectation. At a very minimum, therefore, adding individual to
institutional standing creates a new source of friction on efforts to solve emergent policy puzzles
through institutional innovation.76
The destabilizing effect of individual standing is likely to be much greater than the
destabilizing effect of institutional standing. Their effects will likely diverge because of the
different litigation incentives of individuals and institutions. States and branches—unlike
individuals or interest groups—are necessarily repeat players in their interactions with each
other. Even if they are influenced by interest-group dynamics, states and branches have an
incentive not shared by most individual litigants to maintain their reputation as reliable
interlocutors and bargaining partners. They have this incentive because they normally wish to
preserve the possibility of beneficial cooperation with other governmental entities in later
periods.77 Institutional actors therefore have some incentive to invoke the judicial process if and
only if a given law violates some exogenously determined structural rule.78 More concretely, the
Solicitor General, who represents the United States in the Supreme Court is often said to act
somewhat akin to a “tenth Justice” by “tak[ing] the position that reflects his best judgment of
what the law is, just as he would if he were literally a Justice.”79 The long-term, institutional
perspective adopted by the Solicitor General is powerful evidence that institutions’ litigation
behavior is not wholly reducible to the play of interest-group interests. The same is also likely to
be true of states’ attorneys general, if to a lesser degree. Institutional actors thus have less
incentive to invoke judicial review if it means unraveling a deal in which they have participated.
Even if institutions have standing to bring structural constitutional challenges, therefore, they has
some incentive to accept the accommodations and innovations necessary to preserve basic
aspects of the constitutional architecture against shifting political, social, and economic trends.80
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The incentives of individuals, by contrast, are unconstrained by the allure of potential
gains from repeated interactions and the compulsion to preserve reputation. Rather, many
litigants will be one-shot players, or at best representatives of interest groups pursing selfinterested strategies orthogonal to the goals of preserving structural constitutional principles or
maximizing overall social welfare. Unlike institutional actors, they have an incentive to file suit
when a legislative intervention impedes their interests, whether or not the new law violates a
structural constitutional principle. Provided expected litigated costs are sufficiently low, interest
groups have an incentive to challenge valid as well as invalid arrangements in the hope that a
federal judge errs and invalidates the rule.81 The hope is not baseless. Judges are at a large
comparative institutional disadvantage when it comes to determining whether and how different
aspects of national constitutional design interact and either do or do not offset each other.82
Individual litigants’ strategy of maximizing private gains from structural litigation—a goal that
institutional litigants do not share—therefore presses outcomes away from desirable interbranch
and intergovernmental equilibriums.
To be sure, expanding standing for the structural constitution to include individuals does
yield one benefit: the likelihood of unconstitutional arrangements being challenged and
invalidated goes up. But it is hard to see why this should be decisive. Institutions such as states
and branches already have some quantum of motivation to defend their own prerogatives. To be
sure, office holders may not always be motivated by the best interests of their institutions. But
this worry is easy to overdo: there is plenty of evidence that participants in the American
political system take seriously values of legality and constitutionality. Further, it is hardly clear
that allowing post hoc interventions by individual litigants would remedy office-holders’ lack of
motivation to defend institutional prerogatives. Those individual litigants have even less reason
to care about the constitutional balance. They are more likely to be focused on the instrumental
deployment of structural constitutional principles as devices to attain other exogenous policy
ends. And it is passing odd to say that since office-holders are distracted from the pursuit of
structural constitutional values by parochial political concerns, the very interest groups driving
those narrow, political goals should be authorized to take up the baton of institutional interests in
federal court. It is less odd to think that even if officials are influenced by interest groups, they
nonetheless have some independence of action, seem to take institutional perspectives, and
anticipate iterative interactions in ways that distinguish them from individuals.
*

*

*

In short, whereas there are powerful arguments against individual standing for the
structural constitution, there are at least colorable arguments that institutional standing alone will
do an adequate (but hardly perfect) job. Individual standing in this context will tend to
destabilize the federal-state and interbranch balances. By contrast, states and the political
branches will often be motivated by more desirable incentives than individual litigants because
81
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they are more deeply embedded in institutional cultures and iterative interactions. Comparative
analysis in sum suggests that individual standing should be discarded in favor of institutional
standing alone in structural constitutional cases.
V.

Recalibrating Standing for the Structural Constitution

If the doctrinal and institutional consequences of allowing individuals access to the
federal courts to pursue structural constitutional arguments are unwelcome, how should
constitutional law change? This Part proposes a new gloss on standing doctrine that would
mitigate the undesirable consequences cataloged in Parts II and III. The aim of my proposed
doctrinal reform is narrowly drawn. I do not propose to render structural constitutional litigation
wholly nonjusticiable. Perhaps that result is justified on other grounds. But I have not argued for
that much larger shift in the judicial role here. Eschewing any such ‘bait and switch’, the
proposal detailed here would mitigate the deleterious effects of individual standing for the
structural constitution without wholly removing the courts from the business of structural
constitutional enforcement.
The proposed new rule for standing in respect to the structural constitution goes as
follows: When an individual litigant seeks to enforce a structural constitutional principle
redounding to the benefit of an official institution, and there is no reason the latter could not
enforce that interest itself, a federal court should not permit the individual litigant to allege and
obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or federalism. In the mine run of cases, it is
the case that the branch, the state, or an official of one of these governmental entities will have
standing to raise a claim. Congress or the executive, that is, can and do sue to protect Article I or
Article II prerogatives. States can challenge laws that exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority, as the recent healthcare litigation shows, or its authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In most cases, therefore, this categorical rule bars individual standing.
In a subset of cases, however, it permits third-party standing on behalf of the structural
constitution when there is a first-party litigant available to defend a constitutional value in court.
[The paper proceeds to elaborate this idea at greater length]
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